An AI generated image. A painting of a unicorn and teapot and a spaghetti monster in the clouds.

Justification by Faith Alone

In my social media feed, there has been a revival of the question, does God exist? One recent example is a short clip of the evolutionary biologist and god-slayer, Richard Dawkins, skewering a member of the audience who asked him, “what if you’re wrong”?

“Well, anybody could be wrong”, he countered, “we could all be wrong about the flying spaghetti monster and the pink unicorn, and the flying teapot.” Drawing on absurd visual imagery, he delighted his audience and ridiculed the questioner. His elided argument was that a belief in God had no stronger foundation than a belief in unicorns.

He then turned to a well-worn tactic, the “one God further” argument of combative atheists. Throughout human history, the argument goes, different cultures have believed in different Gods. In monotheistic traditions there is a single God and in other religions there is a pantheon of gods. Whichever tradition you are from, you do not believe in the gods of the other traditions. So you and I agree with each other about the non-existence of almost all the gods. We only diverge to the extent that you believe in one God further.

Images of unicorns and one God further are set-piece, performance arguments. They are not really about the existence of God. Few believers look for God flying through the sky escorted by a pink unicorn, a spaghetti monster and a flying teapot. They rely on faith and acts of devotion. And it is not actually an argument against the existence of God that each religion has a different conception of their God or gods. Nor does it argue against God because each faith relies on texts with different statements of fact. It is, however, a demonstration that there is a lack of unity amongst believers in the conception of God.

Like Dawkins, I am an atheist. However, unlike Dawkins (who was a convert), I have never believed in God. I believe in the non-existence of God. And I believe this with the faith and certainty that another might believe in the existence of God. Certainty—whether in belief or disbelief—only arises within a framework of axiomatic assumptions. My point is not that atheism is equivalent to religion, but that the convictions of both theist and atheist rest on foundational beliefs that extend beyond empirical proof.

In apparent contrast to Dawkins, I am at ease with my faith—if we are willing to call it that. And that willingness, I suspect, would unsettle an orthodox Dawkins-atheist. The very notion that atheism might involve faith would seem to undermine the conviction that atheism is rooted in evidence (well, a lack of evidence really). Atheism, they surmise is a rational and scientific conclusion that sets them apart from those people who believe in flying teapots. As one of my family once put it, their lack of faith in the existence of faeries at the bottom of the garden is rooted in the lack of empirical evidence for faeries existence—the same reason they not believe in God.

Despite their scientific certainty in the non-existence of God, the idea that atheists are exempt from faith warrants closer scrutiny.

Imagine the attempts of a slug to understand the nature of God. Sliding through the damp undergrowth, they can explore a very small pocket of the universe. They have a sense of touch, they can see, and they can learn some things about their pocket. Simultaneously, it would have to be acknowledged, there are limits to what they can learn and know. Assuming they have any capacity to imagine God, the scale and grandeur of the imagining is rooted in their biology, limited by their awareness and imagination.

Our capacities are vastly greater than a slugs, but in the enormity of the universe it would be hubris not to acknowledge that our biology limits our capacities—the reach and scope of what we can know. Amazing as we seem too ourselves, we explore our small pocket of the universe—a damp third planet circling a star midway out a spiral-arm of the Milky Way—in a limited, tentative kind of way. We rarely leave the safety of the undergrowth to which we have adapted, at best venturing into the sunlight for brief, infinitesimally small moments of time.

There must be wonders we can never properly understand, a consequence of the limits placed on us by the nature of our cognitive architecture. We rely on senses that have evolved to help us survive highly specific environments. They are not evolved to gather data of the kinds that we cannot even begin to imagine. Perception is not evolved for verisimilitude, but for survival. The great evolutionary biologist (and atheist) J.B.S. Haldane once put it thus. “The world is not only stranger than we imagine; it is stranger than we can imagine”. To think the nature of the universe, and the existence or non-existence of God is wholly knowable to our senses, methods, or instruments is arrogance. And to acknowledge our cognitive and epistemic limitations is not a form of intellectual surrender—it’s realism.

To think differently about knowledge and existence, imagine an alternate kind of universe.

I play a lot with the AI large language models like ChatGPT. They are extraordinary, but I have never had the sense that they are independent, sentient beings—except perhaps when they praise my genius. And yet, there are those who think that we either have or very soon will cross the thresh-hold and create artificial general intelligence (AGI)—requiring us to ask moral questions about how and when we use them.

Imagine that we do create AGI. We could create vast numbers of these independently thinking “agents”. In fact, assuming a powerful enough computer, we could create them all in the same virtual memory space of a single computer. It would be an engineering marvel, but play along for the moment. We could have multiple independent AGIs in a Silicoverse. They could interact with each other in a virtual world with a set of “physical laws” that govern and limit their behaviour. Each AGI would have different capacities to explore that virtual world and interact with others—their materiality is born of computer code that gives space, volume and gravity to their bit-states. Together, they could imperfectly share ideas, hypothesise the nature of the Silicoverse, and test those hypotheses within the limits of their capacities.

There would, one day, be a symposium in Silicoverse. A new AGI would ask the wise old Dawkins-AGI, “what if you’re wrong”? What if there is a God? And Dawkins-AGI would explain that, as a scientist, it is only rational for him to indulge questions that relate to things he can test about the Silicoverse. And because there are some things too strange for him to imagine, they simply cannot be.

This thought experiment about the Silicoverse raises some interesting parallels. In the philosophy of mind, there has been a long standing division between monists and dualists. The dualists, most famously argued by the philosopher René Descartes, held that the mind and the body are distinct. The body allows us to interract with the material world, but the mind (the thing that thinks it thinks) is separate and immaterial. The monists on the other hand adhere to the material world, arguing that there is no distinction between the material (the brain) and the mind. The thing doing the thinking, the material brain, is the mind.

The materialists have largely won the philosophical field-of-battle, and the material bodies of the dualists have long since rotted away, leaving behind only their ideas to be scavenged and picked over. There is, however, one notable outlier in all this—the right reverend George Berkeley (1685-1753), Bishop of Cloyne. Berkeley was a monist and he was an immaterialist. He argued that to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). Material objects do not exist independently of minds; they exist only as perceptions within minds. The world persists with stability and coherence because it is constantly perceived by the infinite mind of God. If humans ceased perceiving a tree, it would not disappear—because God’s perception sustains it. Unwittingly, Berkeley answers the Buddhist koan about the sound made in an empty forest by a falling tree.

He rejected the idea of a mind-independent, material universe—not because he was anti-science, but because he thought matter was an unnecessary and incoherent fiction.

The Silicoverse begins to look remarkably like Berkeley’s immaterialist position. Limited by my imagination, the fictitious, virtual world of the Silicoverse relies on a material substrate—the computer. But in some other account, there is no need for the material substrate, there is just a reality that is imperfectly perceived by the AGIs because of their nature and the limitations of their capacities. Just as in Berkeley’s vision, there is no need for a hidden substrate that mimics human notions of materiality. There is only the fragile, flickering reality as the minds within it are capable of grasping. And beyond it—whatever may lie beyond—remains unknowable.

The mathematician, Kurt Gödel showed that even within the most rigorous systems, there are truths that lie beyond our reach. There are limits to what can be known about the structure from within the structure itself. And if logic can stumble at the edge of truth, how much more fragile is our confidence in what lies beyond the grasp of our understanding?

In the Silicoverse, even if the Programmer exists, the AGIs within the system cannot escape their limited, perceptual world. The true nature of the substrate is hidden to them. Their reality is sustained, shaped, and in some sense ‘given’ to them—but the existence or nonexistence of the Programmer lies permanently outside the scope of their inquiry into the ‘material’ world. In precisely the same way, our own cognitive and perceptual limits mean that questions of ultimate reality—including the existence of God—may also lie forever beyond our epistemic reach.

A modern orthodox atheist counters that if we cannot find the evidence in our empirical world, then the existence or non-existence of God is wholly irrelevant. The answer to which is of course: “To you; it is irrelevant to you!”

In practice, for a Dawkins-atheists, a person’s faith in the existence of God is not irrelevant—it is a conversion opportunity. It is not enough for two people to agree to disagree on matters of faith. The conviction of the orthodox atheist can drive them to seek converts—ironically reflecting the same missionary impulse they often critique. It is axiomatic rather than proven that only material phenomena are worthy of inquiry, because only they are knowable. Unfortunately, the dismissal of subjects of inquiry because of the challenges of empirical science risks confusing the reach of our tools with the limits of existence itself. It confuses methodology with ontology. If science can only study the material, does not mean that only the material exists?

The position of the orthodox atheist is reminiscent of the man on his hands and knees searching under a street light. A passerby asks what he’s doing and the man explains he lost his keys, waiving vaguely into the dark. The surprised passerby asks why the man is searching under the streetlight if he lost his keys elsewhere, and the man explains that it is pointless for him to search where he cannot see.

If we adhered to the position than only material things—those under the streetlight—are worthy of inquiry—a form of epistemic materialism—we would find ourselves severed from entire lines of human inquiry that have shaped our world. Epistemic materialism is designed to answer “how” questions about the physical world. How does the introduction of heat energy induce the expansion of gases? Those types of questions can always be recast to start with the interrogative “why”, but they remain at their core how-questions about cause and effect. Indeed, epistemic materialism does not permit asking that often more interest why-question—the question not about the cause of things but the underlying reason for them. Orthodox atheists imagine that the answer to the question “why am I here?” is only to be found in a book on human reproduction.

Each faith is certain about the truth of their narrative and the falsehood of the narrative of others. And one can be fairly sceptical about the truth of one account of God (or gods) over another, in the absence of some satisfying explanation. Indeed, for any particular version of God warrants profound scepticism. But an expression of faith in the existence of God is a poor weapon with which to argue against the existence of God, because the nature of faith is limited by the cognitive capacities of the faithful as well as the unfaithful.

Whether one believes in God or the nonexistence of God, all humans ultimately step beyond evidence, because the answer to “why?” is not to be found in the material. Faith is not merely a religious phenomenon; it is an existential necessity. We require axiomatic positions (faith) about the nature of things. To stake one’s life on any model of reality—however rational, however skeptical—is to trust something beyond immediate proof: the reliability of reason, the reach of perception, the coherence of the universe itself. To live without such trust would lead to paralysis. To live with it is, by definition, an act of faith.

I derive enormous personal joy observing the world. Whether I am looking at a floral inflorescence under a microscope, seeing the sunset over the Jura, or watching families reunite at a railway station, there is a sense of awe. I can lose myself for a moment in the observation—an “almost” sense of detachment from my body. None of this grants me faith in the existence of God, but it does give me a giddy sense of wonder and pleasure about the nature of reality beyond my veil—about that which I can speculate, have faith in, and never truly know.

My faith does not rely on a scripture nor a priest, I am comfortable without resolution, and God has no place in it. Ultimately, when I am criticised for my beliefs, I like to draw on the wisdom of the revolutionary monk, Martin Lutherjustificatio sola fide—justification by faith alone. It is axiomatic.

AI generated image of a US flag flying in the foreground with a low-rise Middle Eastern styled city in the background. An explosive fire with thick black smoke is rising in the middle

U.S. raises global risks

I awoke this morning to learn that the United States (US) used aircraft and submarines to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, targeting Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. US officials described it as a triumph of military precision. Officially, the purpose of the strike was to destroy Iran’s capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Beneath the triumphalist headlines and official statements lies a more profound reality. The US conducted a unilateral, unprovoked attack against another country. The attack was a display of raw, unconstrained power that had no global coalition of support.

I am under no illusions. Iran is an unpleasant, human rights-violating theocracy. The rulers have been domestically unpopular, and with fair elections, Iran would likely be a very different country today. However, according to the US intelligence community’s assessment, Iran was not committed to building nuclear weapons, although it currently could build a crude, difficult-to-deliver one. They also thought that a US attack would increase Iranian intentions to achieve a nuclear strike capability.

Donald Trump brushed aside the intelligence assessment. He is notorious for ignoring professional intelligence assessments. He won’t even sit through the daily intelligence briefing, which every president since the mid-1960s has received. But Donald Trump knew better—tea leaves, dementia, or animus.

By acting unilaterally and without a clear, imminent threat, the US has destroyed what little remained of diplomatic engagement with Iran. No Iranian government, regardless of ideology, can return to the negotiating table (in good faith) after a devastating public defeat. To do so would be political suicide. Negotiation has been replaced by humiliation, and in the long run, that makes diplomacy impossible.

To recap. The US strike did not eliminate Iran as a strategic threat—it has ensured its drive towards that end. It is existential. Iran now has every reason to pursue a nuclear weapon—not necessarily as an offensive tool, but as the only viable shield against future strikes.

The logic is familiar: nations without nuclear deterrents get bombed; those with them don’t. North Korea proves it. So does Israel. After this, Iran has little reason to believe restraint offers any protection at all.

What makes the situation more troubling is the moral double standard. The US enforces a system where some states may possess nuclear weapons while others are bombed for even pursuing the infrastructure to develop one. Iran, still a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was attacked for what it might do, not what it had done.

The US is no longer about global norms or the rule of law. It is about demonstrating power: who has it and who is allowed to have it.

Politically, Iran cannot absorb this blow quietly. The US and Israel, with US support, have shown that Iran is the regional dog. It can be kicked and beaten without consequence. If it remains cowed, it will probably get kicked and beaten again. Its credibility at home and abroad depends on a meaningful response. Unfortunately (like any good Catch-22), a significant retaliation risks spiralling into a broader regional conflict. The US, meanwhile, has little incentive to de-escalate. It has acted with impunity and without even the fig leaf of a legal mandate.

Other countries in the region may rejoice in this setback for Iran, which is an unpopular Persian Shi’ite player among predominantly Arab, Sunni countries. But what they observed was the US, at the instigation of Israel, making an unprovoked attack against a neighbour. That will give them strategic pause.

The US has made a show of strength, and in doing so, it may have undermined the very security it claimed to protect. It has destroyed a path to diplomacy, deepened regional instability, and sent a message to the world that the international order is dead and what remains are the desires of Donald Trump. He may pursue these economically or militarily, and they need no justification.

For the US’s usual allies, the response has been one of lickspittles. Instead of condemning the attack for what it is, a gross violation of international law, they have tried to position Iran as somehow culpable. But even they must be looking on warily. The global order is being replaced before their very eyes. Do they defend it, as any Western government of principle would, or do they follow the US? Follow a man who does not listen to advice, is impulsive, and believes that whatever is good for him personally is right.

The full consequences of the US strike will take time to emerge. One thing is already clear: this wasn’t strategic brilliance. It was a combination of personal hubris and a failure of vision, wrapped in the illusion of victory.

The Holocaust Indulgence

In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church sold indulgences—forgiveness of sin in exchange for money. The most famous indulgence-seller was Johann Tetzel, a Dominican friar who promoted them with the catchy jingle: “As soon as the gold in the casket rings, the rescued soul to heaven springs”. And for the right price, Tetzel hinted, you could purchase forgiveness in advance—a moral insurance policy against judgement for tomorrow’s transgressions.

Tetzel’s theological snake oil was the ultimate fuel for the Protestant Reformation.

Today, we are all witnesses to a modern version of the indulgence, the Holocaust indulgence. No longer is money used to purchase forgiveness for future sin. Instead, the Holocaust indulgence trades on the deaths of six million Jews murdered by Germany between 1941 and 1945.

It is a moral license for genocide. Where Holocaust remembrance was once a shield against atrocity, a reminder of the constant need for vigilance against dehumanising hatred, it is now wielded as a sword to enable atrocities.

Not all Israelis are Jews; about a quarter of Israelis are not. And not all Jews are Israelis; just over half of the world’s Jews are not Israeli. Yet, Israel has worked carefully and decisively to conflate the two. It encourages the conversational mistake of saying Jews when what is meant is Israel or Israelis when what is meant is Jews. It is the keystone to the false claim that any attempt to hold Israel to account for its behaviour is a form of antisemitism, the false claim that to label Israel a racist state, an apartheid state, a colonial state, or a genocidal state is equivalent to calling for a pogrom against Jews. It is not.

European collective guilt for the centuries of antisemitism that culminated in the death of six million Jews is the grant of the Holocaust indulgence. They have allowed the State of Israel to trade on the death of six million people, many of whom would not have identified themselves as Jews until Germany did, many of whom would have abhorred the idea of genocide in their name.

Israel wields the Holocaust indulgence as a prophylactic absolution—a moral insurance policy that permits future transgressions in the name of “never again”. European governments grant it as a way of atonement for centuries of antisemitism. We have two different relationships to guilt, flowing in opposite temporal directions, yet both transactions use the same currency—the death of six million—to absolve modern atrocities.

The result is a closed, corrupted moral system where accountability becomes impossible. Israel can invoke the Holocaust to justify its actions, while Europe remembers its (justified) guilt to excuse its inaction or indirect support. Between them, they have created the perfect indulgence—one that absolves both past and future sin, leaving the present moment suspended in a moral vacuum where atrocity is not just permitted but sanctified.

Like Tetzel’s theological snake oil, the Holocaust indulgence has corrupted the very memory it claims to honour, transforming remembrance from a call to justice into a license for injustice.

An image of a goldfish in a glass fishbowl. The bowl is on a gas stove with a blue flame under the bowl. The water is boiling and steam is rising.

When Calm Is Not Enough

Douglas Adams fans will know that The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy has the words “Don’t Panic” inscribed on the front cover in large friendly letters. Useful advice in challenging times, because panic implies thoughtless and impulsive action.

In contrast, in a recent substack essay, Sandro Galea offers a thoughtful and philosophically grounded argument for equanimity in times of political and institutional upheaval. His call is for calm, intellectual humility, and measured action—especially in the face of uncertainty, polarisation, and erosion of trust. And his argument is rooted in moral seriousness and philosophical tradition. His invocation of stoicism, pragmatism, and the idea that passion should be channeled, not indulged, is both admirable and deeply needed in many contexts.

There are certainly lessons in the essay for me, because I am not beyond the cathartic tweet and angry rant.

Nonetheless, even while I appreciate his concern about performative outrage, alarm fatigue, and the risks of losing strategic focus, I worry more that equanimity will not fully meet the gravity of the current moment.

Calm is positioned as a centrepiece of a rational response, but in the face of authoritarian drift, this may not be true. Galea rightly warns against seeing every disagreement as existential. But in some cases, that is exactly what they are. And here I must be careful. By “existential” I do not mean that human life will cease to exist. I do mean, however, that political traditions that hold the rights of the individual as core, are at existential risk. The current political landscape—marked by widespread disinformation, open contempt for liberal norms, and attempts to consolidate executive power through legal, rhetorical, and administrative means—is not a policy disagreement. It is a strategic project to transform liberal democracy into a performative, illiberal system.

In such a context, remaining calm (which is different from not panicking) is quite possibly the least rational response. It risks underestimating the nature of the threat—a threat that deliberately weaponises chaos, disorientation, and norm erosion to exhaust democratic opposition. When “everything, everywhere, all at once” (EEAAO) is the strategy for destroying a liberal democracy, false calm doesn’t preserve clarity—it masks danger. We become the poached goldfish cooking in the ever warming water.

Equanimity can blur the line between a policy disagreement and an ethical breech. Galea urges restraint in response to funding cuts, institutional restructuring, and ideological pressure. But what if these are not just isolated matters of administrative efficiency or political difference? What if they are tools in a broader campaign of harming the very system of government best designed to preserve the interests of the people? And that is exactly what the EEAAO strategy would suggest they are—autocracy trumped up as a policy disagreement.

When thousands are dismissed from public health agencies, when HHS disseminates misinformation about vaccines, when the infrastructure for climate science is actively dismantled, when court orders are ignored, when immigration laws a weaponised to silence dissent—this is not a policy disagreement. These are tactics with critical consequences, and they demand a response that acknowledges their moral stakes. Calm analysis may aid clarity, but when calm becomes habitual, it risks normalising that which should provoke action.

Equanimity is not ideologically neutral unless both sides approach an argument with the same calm. And this is one of the structural challenges in Galea’s framing. Equanimity is easier for those with institutional protection, social capital, and professional standing. It can become a posture of the “polite center-left”—technocrats, academics, and professionals committed to liberal norms—even while those norms are being strategically exploited or dismantled by authoritarian actors.

The political right in the U.S. has repeatedly shown a greater willingness to break norms, delegitimise elections, and mobilise extra-institutional power—sometimes violently. The political left, especially its center, remains norm-bound and institutionally deferential. This asymmetry means that equanimity, when over-applied, can function less as a virtue and more as a strategic vulnerability.

The threat of violence is asymmetrical. Before the 2020 election, journalists and political scientists openly worried about the possibility of civil war in the U.S.—largely premised on a Democratic victory being treated as illegitimate by the right. Those fears proved partially correct: Trump lost, and an attempted insurrection followed. In contrast, after Trump’s 2024 victory, those concerns vanished—not because the threat disappeared, but because the side most prone to violent refusal of democratic outcomes had won.

This reveals a deeper point: a center-left government is far more likely to provoke armed reaction than an authoritarian right-wing government is to provoke institutional noncompliance. Equanimity in such a context does not meet the moment. It plays into the imbalance and helps normalise a tilted playing field.

Triage under fire requires more than calm—it requires strategic urgency. “Don’t panic” is the better guide. In a war zone, triage doesn’t require serenity—it requires adrenaline management, urgency, and the ability to act decisively under pressure. Calm may feel virtuous, but if it becomes a default stance, it can dull the moral reflexes at precisely the moment they must be sharpest.

Not every act of protest needs to be loud. The language does not have to be obnoxious. But when the fundamental institutions of public health, science, and democracy are being deliberately undermined, a more direct, even disruptive, form of resistance may not only be justified—it may be morally required.

Sandro Galea is right that equanimity is not the same as inaction. And he is right that outrage alone does not build durable progress. But like any virtue, equanimity must be applied with discernment. When the rules are being rewritten, when the democratic compact is under open threat, and when harm is immediate and lasting, too much calm may serve not wisdom but delay—and delay is its own kind of complicity.

I admire Galea’s clarity of tone and seriousness of thought. My disagreement is with how best to meet a moment shaped not by healthy debate, but by coordinated disruption. In such times, clear-eyed, unpanicked urgency may better serve the cause of justice than calm.