Category Archives: Leadership

A Crime Boss is not a force for good

When US forces kidnapped Nicolás Maduro in Caracas last week they acted illegally. They broke multiple international laws. The President of the United States publicly declared that he cannot be held to account. He is not constrained by the law, he said, he is (un)constrained by his personal (im)morality.

There is no doubt that Maduro was a brutal and repressive dictator, and a majority of the people of Venezuela wanted democratic change. They had voted for it in 2024. Did Donald Trump and the United States act morally in removing this man from power?

Consider three scenarios:

Scenario 1: An honest passerby sees a thug beating an elderly person. She tackles the thug and saves the victim.

Scenario 2: A Mafia Boss sees the same assault. He notices the thug’s expensive gold bracelet, tackles him, steals the bracelet, and the elderly person is saved.

Scenario 3: An honest passerby witnesses the assault but is too frightened to intervene. She calls a known Mafia Boss for help. He tackles the thug, steals the bracelet, and the elderly person is saved.

Only Scenario 1 deserves praise. The passerby acts from virtuous motives and achieves a good outcome. But what of the Mafia Boss?

In Scenario 2, he performs a superficially right action (stopping an assault) but for entirely immoral purpose (theft). The victim benefits, but this is incidental to the Mafia Boss’s criminal purpose. Most moral traditions recognise this distinction. We praise people for their character and intentions, not merely for producing beneficial side effects. A surgeon who saves a patient primarily to steal their jewellery hasn’t acted virtuously, even though the patient survives.

The Mafia Boss might deserve some credit for not making things worse—he could have ignored the victim or joined the assault. But “not being as bad as possible” isn’t praiseworthy. At most, we might say: “How fortunate his greed led him to intervene”—but this concerns lucky consequences, not moral worth.

Scenario 3 adds complexity. The passerby achieves a good outcome she couldn’t manage alone, but she’s complicit in the theft by knowingly involving a criminal. This is the classic “dirty hands” dilemma: when achieving good outcomes requires morally tainted means.

Now apply this to Venezuela.

We are in Scenario 2 (possibly Scenario 3) territory. Trump’s own words reveal his motives with startling clarity. “We’re going to be using oil, and we’re going to be taking oil”, he told the New York Times. “We will rebuild it in a very profitable way”. He repeatedly emphasised making money for the United States, settling old scores over nationalisation (“they took the oil from us years ago”), and has already begun negotiating with American oil executives.

The pattern of decisions confirms this. Rather than recognising María Corina Machado—the Nobel Peace Prize-winning opposition leader whose party won Venezuela’s 2024 election—Trump works with Maduro’s former vice president, a regime loyalist. Why? Because “she’s essentially willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again,” Trump said, meaning granting American companies renewed access to Venezuela’s oil industry. There’s no timeline for elections, no commitment to Venezuelan self-governance. “Only time will tell”, Trump said when asked how long US control would last. “I would say much longer” than a year.

The stated justifications—drugs, migration, terrorism—don’t withstand scrutiny. Venezuela accounts for minimal drug trafficking to the US. The intervention followed months of pressure focused squarely on oil: sanctions, blockades, and seizing tankers.

This is Scenario 2. An authoritarian leader is removed—arguably beneficial for many Venezuelans—but primarily to facilitate resource extraction. The relief for Venezuelans is incidental to the core objective.

The Mafia Boss deserves no praise for saving the elderly person whilst stealing their bracelet. He should be prosecuted for the crime he committed. Donald Trump should be prosecuted for his crimes—Congress has the power.

 

The crimes of the leader

When is an entire nation guilty of the crimes of its leader?

In the aftermath of World War II, there was considerable discussion about the collective responsibility of the German people for the horrific actions of the Nazis. By the mid-1950s, it was almost impossible to find a German who had ever been pro-Nazi—everyone was against it from the start. Whether it was from shame, fear of association, or cognitive dissonance, they would have you believe there was only ever a handful of Nazis and their supporters in Germany.

The truth hardly needs defending. The great majority of Germans knew what the Nazi Party stood for. The last free election held in pre-war Germany was in November 1932, when the Nazi Party won 33% of the vote. The March 1933 election, when the Nazi Party won 43% of the vote, was held after the Reichstag fire and in the presence of significant political intimidation. Before the last free election, the German people knew Hitler. He was openly anti-Semitic, anti-communist, and anti-democratic. In the 1920s, he compared Jews to germs, stating that diseases cannot be controlled unless you destroy their causes. By 1925, he had argued for the special entitlement of Germans for Lebensraum and the conquest of Slavic lands in Eastern Europe. He attempted a coup and established a paramilitary force.

Almost immediately after he won the March election in 1933, he established the first concentration camp (Dachau) for any social and political undesirables. He was also openly anti-Roma and Sinti, and anti-Catholic.

The tendency towards everything that followed historically was there for all to see. What responsibility did the German people have in 1933 to resist? What about ‘34, ‘35, ‘36, ‘37, … ‘45? In 1945, actual membership of the Nazi party was at its highest, about 10% of the population. When were the German people collectively responsible for their government’s actions?

In many ways, the question is unfair. How can a Bavarian farmer bear the same responsibility as a concentration camp commandant? Those who joined the party, served in the Einsatzgruppen, or otherwise actively participated in Nazi crimes must bear a more direct criminal and moral responsibility. What of the civil servants? What of those who made sure the infamous trains ran on time, delivering millions to their deaths? What is the moral calculus associated with the flow of benefits—direct and indirect—from the persecution of others, such as cheap farm labour from concentration camps, a new home, more job availability, etc.?

The night of 9 November 1938 was Kristallnacht—a pogrom against Jews throughout Germany and Austria. Over 1,400 synagogues were burned, thousands of Jewish businesses were destroyed, Jewish homes were ransacked, and dozens were killed in the streets. The violence was public, visible, and undeniable. Evidence suggests that many Germans—perhaps most—disapproved of the brutality and destruction. But this disapproval remained private and passive. There were no mass protests, no general strikes, no widespread efforts to shelter Jewish neighbours. The gap between private discomfort and public acquiescence reveals something crucial about collective responsibility: moral squeamishness without moral courage is functionally equivalent to complicity. After Kristallnacht, no German could claim ignorance of the regime’s violent intentions. The persecution was no longer bureaucratic or hidden—it happened in city centres with flames visible for miles. If it hadn’t before, Kristallnacht was the moment when passive opposition became morally insufficient, when continued participation in or acceptance of the Nazi system—even by those who privately disapproved—became a choice that enabled everything that followed.

What does resistance look like? Rolling and continuous general strikes, protests, refusal to deliver to, repair, or assist the state apparatus. It is painful; it will result in loss of liberty, loss of property, and, probably, loss of life. Resistance starts with the most, not those with the least. It will fracture families and friendships.

Where Americans have resisted the Trump administration, they have used polite institutional resistance—lawsuits, protests, opinion pieces, and letters to the editor—all of which assume the system can contain someone who fundamentally doesn’t operate within its rules. It’s the equivalent of Germans relying on Weimar constitutional mechanisms to check Hitler after 1933. The Supreme Court has essentially unleashed a criminal President, because by definition, he cannot commit a crime, and he is only enjoined after he has turned a criminal act into a de facto reality. You cannot un-ring the illegal bells he rings.

That’s an outrageous parallel, you say. Donald Trump is no Hitler. And I agree. Donald Trump is a greedy, narcissistic kleptocrat. And in the name of the American people, he has committed international crimes. He has supported genocide. He has ordered the extra-judicial killing of scores of people. He has threatened allies with invasion. He has had people imprisoned without due process. He has had people tortured. He has destroyed the multilateral system. He has put troops on the streets of US cities. He has attempted (it remains to be seen if he succeeds) to subvert the electoral system. He has compelled universities and multi-billion-dollar corporations to bend to his will. He and his family have stolen and extorted billions.

But whether Trump is Hitler is not the question. The question is: when do the American people bear collective responsibility for their leader’s actions? Like the German people in 1933, they knew their leader when they elected him in 2024—and unlike Hitler, they gave him a majority of the votes (not just the Electoral College). When they voted for him, they knew he did not follow the law. They knew he used violence to take what he wanted. They knew he was racist. They knew he pursued his personal interests above any greater good. They knew he was driven by vanity.

Where the German people opposed passively, the American people have resisted institutionally, at a time when institutions do not constrain power. Both groups chose mechanisms of resistance that enabled the regimes they oppose. Both nations bear collective responsibility for their leaders’ actions.

Postscript. Democracies offer their citizens a get-out-of-jail-free card. We elect a new leader, and we are absolved. We held the previous regime accountable and cast them out. Our sins are forgiven. I have always found it a slightly uncomfortable moral maneuver, but I do understand it.

In 2020, Americans could claim they had corrected their mistake. They voted Trump out. Democracy worked. They could also seek comfort in the fact that he failed to win the popular vote. Yes, he won the Electoral College vote, and that is a flaw in our system, but as a people, we rejected him. Then they voted him back in—with full knowledge of what he had done, who he was, and what he would do. The absolution was a lie. The accountability was performance. And the collective responsibility deepens.

The Foreign Gaze: A Review

Seye Abimbola’s book, The Foreign Gaze, is a thoughtful and often elegantly written account of how power distorts knowledge production in global health. Drawing on personal experience and philosophical insight, Abimbola introduces the concept of “the foreign gaze” to describe the way researchers, particularly from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), shape their work for external audiences—northern donors, editors, reviewers, and institutions. The result, he argues, is a system where knowledge is produced not for the people it is intended to serve, but for those who control its global circulation and validation.

The strength of the book lies in its clear moral purpose. Abimbola calls for greater attention to “pose” (the standpoint of the knower) and “gaze” (the intended audience), and argues for an ethic of epistemic justice—where local actors are not just included in global conversations but are recognised as authoritative producers and users of knowledge in their own right. He speaks with conviction about the daily indignities of exclusion and marginalisation, and the ways in which academic global health often fails those working at the front lines of health systems.

And yet, for all its rhetorical clarity and moral force, The Foreign Gaze is ultimately an unbalanced critique. It targets external systems of authority—foreign reviewers, northern journals, donor agendas—without seriously interrogating the internal dynamics of epistemic dependence within LMICs themselves. In doing so, it offers a partial, and sometimes evasive, account of the problem it sets out to name.

First, the book is morally lopsided. Abimbola presents the Global South as the passive object of northern scrutiny, not fully acknowledging how deeply southern actors participate in, benefit from, and scaffold the system he critiques. Nor does he describe the effort that Global South actors will go to, to be seen by the Global North. Ministries of health design policies to satisfy donor templates. Researchers tailor proposals to align with northern funding calls. Academic careers are built on publishing in northern journals and securing foreign recognition. These are not the actions of helpless victims; they are rational and strategic choices made within unequal systems. Yet Abimbola offers little analysis of this internal complicity and treats the relationship as Manichean: colonial = bad, indigenous = good.

This lopsidedness extends to his treatment of knowledge. At key moments, he blurs the line between affirming the dignity of knowers and valourising the truth of what they claim to know. He rightly insists that people must not be dismissed because of their institutional distance from power—but he often slides into assuming that local practices are not only morally meaningful but epistemically equivalent to biomedical science. This argument is especially evident in his discussion of Nigerian group antenatal care, which he treats as if it should be shielded from empirical evaluation, even while dismissing external attempts to rigorously assess it. The suggestion is that foreign testing is not just misplaced but offensive.

Yet this defence reveals a more profound contradiction. The Foreign Gaze claims to champion epistemic justice but curates who counts as a knower. Abimbola elevates midwives, grassroots health workers, and insider academics, but gives little attention to the knowers within communities whose influence may be coercive, regressive, or misinformed. The dignity of knowers, in his account, is reserved for those whose knowledge can be rendered morally resonant. In this way, the book replicates the very asymmetries it aims to dismantle: it replaces epistemic exclusion with selective inclusion, rather than with principled universality.

Though Abimbola does not argue for relativism outright, his privileging of proximity lacks an accompanying framework for testing or contesting local knowledge. In practice, this leaves him affirming certain local claims without clear criteria, especially when those claims conflict or reproduce harm. By challenging foreign authority without articulating how legitimacy should be assessed within local contexts, he risks substituting one opaque hierarchy for another. The absence of a mechanism for epistemic accountability within the ‘proximate’ space undermines the critical edge of his argument.

Second, the book is epistemically incomplete. It assumes that valuable local knowledge lies waiting to be recognised if only the foreign gaze would look away. While Abimbola acknowledges that local experts often tailor their work for foreign audiences, he avoids more profound questions about how this orientation emerged and why it endures. He does not examine how colonial and missionary legacies have shaped the epistemic cultures of southern institutions, or why local scholars rarely seek to theorise indigenous practices on their own terms. For instance, he praises group antenatal care in Nigeria as a locally grounded example, but never considers how inherited pedagogies already structure such practices. The deeper question is, why has so much southern knowledge production become mimicry rather than innovation?—remains largely unexplored.

This omission is particularly striking in light of historical examples like the suppression of variolation in colonial India. Indigenous practitioners had developed a functional method of smallpox inoculation, yet this knowledge was not allowed to evolve because colonial authorities replaced it with vaccination. The British enforced an epistemic closure from the outside, but the long-term effect was an internalised deference to another’s science. Abimbola touches none of this. He writes as if the gaze is the primary agent, and the south merely its object, ignoring the centuries of adaptation, aspiration, and abandonment that have shaped southern scientific cultures from within.

Finally, the book is strategically ineffective. It underestimates how profound a shift would be required to build independent knowledge systems in the Global South–to shed centuries of epistemic entanglement with the North. To reorient from the foreign gaze is not a matter of redirecting papers to different journals or holding conferences in other cities. It would require building entire epistemic infrastructures: funding mechanisms, review systems, training institutions, and incentive structures capable of rewarding intellectual independence rather than recognition. Abimbola offers no roadmap for this transformation. Nor does he seriously consider whether the current generation of southern institutions—so deeply entangled with northern agendas—could or would lead such a project. In this sense, the book gestures toward autonomy but remains captive to the very structures it critiques.

The core of the problem is this: The Foreign Gaze critiques the act of being watched, but says little about the desire to be seen. It offers a sharp analysis of how knowledge is distorted by foreign audiences, but not of why southern actors so often turn toward those audiences in the first place. Without that second half, the argument remains morally insufficient and structurally incomplete. Finally, it calls for justice, but offers no confrontation with the habits of thought, aspiration, and institutional design that prevent it.

In privileging proximity and local accountability, Abimbola gestures toward a world where “global health” no longer holds together as a coherent epistemic or institutional project, but he stops short of naming this dissolution or reckoning with its consequences.

The Foreign Gaze opens a critical conversation but does not complete it. If epistemic justice is to mean more than moral appeal, it must reckon with both the gaze from without and the longing to be seen from within. Until then, the project risks becoming, in the end, just another performance in the theatre of Northern validation.


Seye Abimbola (2025). The Foreign Gaze: Essays on Global Health. OpenEdition Books: Marseille.

The Star Trek Captain, Jean-Luc Picard as the Borg character Locutus

Resistance is necessary

I complain. A lot. I am not a happy person. But you will never die wondering what I thought or where I stood. Still, complaining isn’t enough, and whinging can feel futile.

The Borg and the rising authoritarian states of the 21st century want you to believe that “resistance is futile.” It isn’t. Resistance is not only necessary; resistance is an obligation.

Small acts of everyday resistance can raise the costs of authoritarianism so high the system collapses. In the late Soviet Union, acts of passive resistance—from workers deliberately slowing down production to citizens openly defying censorship laws—contributed to the erosion of state control. These acts of everyday resistance helped to chip away at the crumbling foundations. Authoritarian regimes rely on compliance to function. When enough people withdraw their cooperation, inefficiency turns into paralysis, and paralysis into collapse. It becomes so grindingly inefficient and ineffective that it fails. The unwillingness of the people to work in the interests of an illegitimate state is that state’s undoing.

Small acts of everyday resistance need not rise to criminality. There are ways of resisting that work, that keep the pressure up, and that allow you to control your level of exposure.

The power of the authoritarian state does not lie in compliance alone. It also lies in isolation—your sense of being alone in your unhappiness. Why do you think the Chinese state is so quick to remove online complaints and hide protests? The protest is not the problem. The protest’s effect is letting others know they are not alone in their unhappiness. And if you do not feel alone, you are also more likely to engage in small acts of everyday resistance.

Work to rule is a classic form of everyday resistance. This tactic has been historically effective in labour movements, such as the bureaucratic slowdowns under oppressive regimes, where workers deliberately followed every regulation to the letter to hinder authoritarian efficiency. Do your job. To the letter. No more. No less. When only one person works to rule, they are a miserable, unhelpful arse. When large numbers of people work to rule, unhappiness shows. It is palpable. In a government department that is engaging in immoral and cruel behaviour (“within the law”), you can slow it down, throw sand in the gearbox, and make it less cruel by being less effective and less efficient.

In the U.S., ICE agents could do their jobs—badly. Administrative staff supporting ICE agents can slow things down by moving paper at an excruciatingly necessary pace. The word “expedite” should be struck from the vocabulary.

Singapore in the late ’80s and ’90s was a highly (overly) regulated society. Many would say it has persisted. But in the ’90s, chewing gum became a tool of everyday resistance. People would stick it over the door sensors on the MRT trains. The doors couldn’t close, and it would bring the system to a grinding halt. The act was small, non-specific in its target, and (back then) unidentifiable.

Posters, protests, badges, public art, and internet memes have all been used to demonstrate everyday resistance. Remembering when the state wants to forget or reimagine a truth is a powerful corrective. Archive the truth on the internet.

In a digital age, careful choices about how and when to use devices, credit cards, and online accounts can disrupt data collection and tracking. Using burner phones where you can get them, paying with cash instead of cards, and setting up anonymous online accounts are small but effective ways to limit surveillance and maintain privacy. Resistance is not about criminality; it is about the right to privacy, the freedom to think, and the quiet power of refusing to comply—to engage in cruelty. Even small acts of everyday resistance remind others they are not alone.

It is possible to resist and chew gum at the same time.

Resources:

If you want some ideas, have a look at these two.