Tag Archives: Resource allocation

A New Global Health Architecture: Maximising Health Returns

There have been a number of opinion pieces, resets, and declarations on what is needed in a new Global Health Architecture. These have been authored by diplomats, former Prime Ministers and Presidents, Multi-lateral agency staff and former staff, Philanthropies and peak bodies on what is needed in a new global health architecture. They have appeared in prestigious peer reviewed journals, on corporate websites, and here, I have attempted to synthesise the core messages and draw them together into an aggregate position that can help national governments action some of the ideas.

It starts with the contemporary global health landscape, which is increasingly defined by structural fiscal contraction, evolving geopolitical priorities, and the imperative to sustain health systems performance under conditions of constrained financing. In this context, legacy colonial models of development assistance—characterised by externally driven priorities, fragmented delivery channels, and open-ended commitments—are no longer fit for purpose. A transition toward more efficient, sovereign-aligned frameworks can deliver health at scale across well segmented population groups.

At the center of this transition is a reassertion of national sovereignty. Low- and low-middle income countries have historically been analysed through the lens of deficit-based models—most notably income, poverty and other World Bank style development indicators. In a context of increasing financial constraint and projected stagnation or decline in economic growth, that approach invites systemic failure.

A better alternative is an analysis of countries through the lens of asset-based models and indicators. This shift allows for a reorientation from needs-based allocation towards strategic engagement, in which financially flexible partners align with nationally defined priorities to co-develop fully costed health pathways. Such pathways provide end-to-end cost visibility, improving efficiency and accountability and enabling the precise calibration of health investments against projected returns. The well-established link between health improvement and economic productivity can be operationalised as part of national investment cases.

This reorientation will motivate a shift away from traditional sovereign lending, with its associated conditionalities, as the dominant financing modality. While sovereign lenders have played a critical role in expanding access and supporting system development, their balance sheets are increasingly constrained. Capital markets offer emerging mechanisms to complement sovereign financing in targeted areas where risk can be appropriately structured and priced. Through structured asset-pooling within and across countries, these mechanisms can enhance risk absorption and expand resource mobilisation. Over time, they may progressively relieve pressure on sovereign financing, enabling health systems to access more diversified funding streams while reducing exposure to fiscal volatility. This, in turn, may lessen reliance on sovereign conditionalities and allow national governments greater implementation flexibility.

Operationalising this shift requires the development of a coherent investment architecture. One approach is the development of Population Equity Units (PEUs), which serve as the foundational analytical and financial entities within national systems. These units can be aggregated into stratified Demographic Asset Classes, reflecting variations in projected lifetime contribution, health system utilisation, and responsiveness to intervention. The introduction of such classifications enables a more granular understanding of where investments are likely to generate the greatest returns for national governments alongside the highest health-valued gains.

To support decision-making across this architecture, a Health Returns Value Index (HRVI) can be employed. The Index would provide a standardised metric for comparing Population Equity Units based on anticipated health outcomes relative to cost. This facilitates outcome-weighted health investment prioritisation, ensuring that limited resources are allocated in a manner consistent with maximising aggregate health systems performance. Importantly, such an Index would allow for dynamic recalibration over time, as demographic, epidemiological, and economic conditions evolve.

Within this framework, national health systems can be conceptualised as Health Equity Portfolios. These portfolios comprise a diversified set of Population Equity Units across multiple Demographic Asset Classes, each contributing differently to overall system yield. Standard portfolio management principles can then be applied, including allocation, rebalancing, and risk mitigation. High-performing segments—those demonstrating strong alignment between investment and realised outcomes—can be prioritised for sustained or increased capital allocation.

Conversely, Population Equity Units falling below defined marginal value thresholds may require structured reassessment. In such cases, mechanisms for managed transition, including consolidation or phased divestment, can be introduced to preserve portfolio efficiency. These processes should be governed by transparent criteria and embedded within broader national planning frameworks to ensure predictability and stability.

The potential integration of capital markets provides an opportunity to further enhance the flexibility of this model. Population Equity Units can be progressively bundled into tradable instruments, including outcome-linked bonds and equity participation vehicles. These instruments allow external sovereign and market investors to assume a share of the financial risk associated with health investments, while aligning returns directly with measurable outcomes. In doing so, they create a direct linkage between system performance and capital flows, reinforcing incentives for efficiency and innovation.

A complementary development is the introduction of rating systems for Demographic Asset Classes. Drawing on established methodologies from financial markets, population segments can be assigned standardised ratings based on projected return profiles and risk characteristics. AAA-rated population segments—those with high expected returns and low variability—can be prioritised for long-term investment, while sub-investment grade cohorts may be subject to targeted de-risking strategies, including controlled exposure limits, selective disengagement, or phased reallocation of resources. Rating migration over time provides an additional feedback mechanism, enabling continuous optimisation of the Health Equity Portfolio, including downgrade-triggered reallocation where required.

One of the strategic advantages of this approach for national governments is the reconceptualisation of equity. Rather than being treated as a purely distributive principle, equity can be operationalised as a function of participation and alignment with system performance requirements. Under this model, Population Equity Units hold differentiated positions within the national portfolio, reflecting their contribution to and benefit from collective investment. This ensures that resource allocation remains responsive to both system performance and evolving demographic realities.

Institutionally, the framework aligns with a broader functional redefinition of global health actors. Multilateral organisations, including normative bodies, can focus on establishing standards, developing metrics such as the HRVI, and convening stakeholders across sectors. Implementation and operational decision-making are devolved to national and regional entities, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. This division of labour reduces duplication and enhances system coherence.

Financing flows, in turn, become more targeted and time-bound. Development assistance becomes progressively redundant, reducing exposure to sovereign conditionalities, and financing is repositioned as catalytic capital, supporting transitions toward domestically anchored and market-enabled systems. Global public goods—such as surveillance, research and development, and epidemic preparedness—remain appropriate areas for sustained collective investment, given their transnational nature and positive externalities. Nonetheless, they would need to demonstrate measurable impact on the Population Equity Units, and a positive return on investment.

The proposed model is not without complexity. The introduction of new instruments, metrics, and governance arrangements requires careful design and sequencing. Data systems must be strengthened to support accurate classification, valuation, and monitoring of Population Equity Units, with the resulting data architecture constituting a high-value analytical asset class in its own right, potentially suitable for managed service provision or structured private participation. Regulatory frameworks must evolve to accommodate novel financing mechanisms while safeguarding system integrity. Capacity building at national and subnational levels is essential to ensure effective portfolio management.

The risks of inaction, however, are far greater. Persisting with fragmented, input-driven, and fiscally unsustainable models will undermine both efficiency and impact. By contrast, a transition toward a maximally efficient, return-oriented framework offers the potential to sustain and enhance health outcomes despite resource constraints.

The convergence of fiscal pressure, institutional reform, and financial innovation creates a significant opportunity to re-engineer the global health architecture around principles of equity, efficiency, alignment, and sustainability. Through the structuring of Population Equity Units, the deployment of the Health Returns Value Index, and the gradual mobilisation of capital markets, it is possible to construct Health Equity Portfolios that are resilient, adaptive, and performance-oriented. Such an approach ensures that, even under conditions of constrained financing, health systems can continue to deliver measurable value at scale for national governments.

Health system sustainability is preserved through disciplined alignment of investment with demonstrable population value.

Would you give knee surgery to the FAT MAN?

I do understand your plight, Mr Smith.  An arthritic knee can be extremely painful.  And you say it’s so bad you can’t even walk from the living room to the kitchen.  That’s actually very good news!  Yes, yes … awful … but terribly good news. If you can’t walk to the kitchen, you can’t eat. If you can’t eat you’ll lose weight.  And the faster you lose weight, the sooner we’ll schedule your knee surgery.

On 15 March 2017, Dr David Black, NHS England’s medical director for Yorkshire and the Humber, sent a letter of praise to the Rotherham Clinical Commissioning Group (RCCG).  The RCCG had decided to restrict the access to smokers and “dangerously overweight patients” of hip and knee surgery.  The letter was leaked, and it has triggered, according to the Guardian, “a storm of protest.”

The title of this blog is a play on David Edmond’s book, Would you kill the fat man, an exploration of moral philosophy and difficult choices about the valuation of human life. The RCCG’s decision intrigued me. It was essentially a decision about rationing a finite commodity — healthcare. In a world of plenty, rationing healthcare is a non-question.  In the real world, however, in a world of shrinking healthcare budgets and a squeezed NHS, resources must be allocated in a way that means some people will receive less healthcare or no healthcare.  Fairness requires that the rules of allocation are transparent and reasonable.

While you ponder, whether you would give knee surgery to the FAT MAN, I have a follow-up question.  Would you want to see a doctor who would deny you knee surgery because of some characteristic of yours unrelated to whether you would benefit from knee surgery?

I am sorry Mrs Smith, today we decided not to offer clinical services to women, people under 5’7″, or carpenters. We need to cut the costs of our clinical services, and by excluding those groups, we can save an absolute bundle.

I have heard it said of the doctor, academic and human rights advocate, Paul Farmer, that he would regularly re-allocate hospital resources from Boston to his very needy patients in Haiti.  He used to raid the drug stocks of a Boston hospital, stuff them in his suitcase and fly them back to his patients in Haiti.  I have no idea if the story is true or not. It does mark, however, one of the great traditions of medicine.  The role of a doctor is to advocate vigorously for the health (and often social) needs of the patient.  The patient actually in front of them.  The one in need.  Because, if your doctor will not advocate for your health needs, who will?  This is why all the great TV hospital dramas show a clash between the doctor and the hospital administrator.  Administrators ration.  Doctors treat.  The doctor goes all out to save little Jenny, against all odds.  The surly hospital administrator stands in front of the operating room, hand outstretched and declares (Pythonesque): “None shall pass.”

Under the current NHS system of clinical commissioning groups, there are family doctors who are simultaneously trying to make rational decisions about the allocation of limited resources to a population, and trying to be the best health advocates for the patient in front of them.  That screams conflict of interest. If you live in the catchment area of the RCCG and want my advice, check out which doctors are part of the RCCG.  If your doctor is one of them, change doctor immediately. Treating you, advocating for your health interests is what you need and should want.  Unfortunately, if she is part of the RCCG when she is treating you, you are not her principal concern.  Run(!) assuming of course that you don’t need knee surgery.

Should smokers and overweight people receive knee surgery?  Let’s start with smokers.  Why would you not want to treat a smoker?  It is difficult to come up with arguments that are not so outrageous that they are embarrassing to make. But I won’t let personal embarrassment get in the way of stating the top two silly arguments that came to mind:

  1. Smoking is a disgusting habit and anyone who smokes deserves all the pain they get?
  2. Smokers won’t live as long as non-smokers, so the investment in surgery to reduce pain and improve mobility in smokers will not have the net benefits to society as the same investment in non-smokers.

The arguments for restricting the surgery to people who are not overweight are similarly cringe-worthy.  There are also clinical reasons for prioritising the overweight.  The load on joints resulting from increased weight creates greater wear-and-tear and, the broader inflammatory processes that obesity triggers also seem to increase the risks of osteoarthritis — affecting hands as well as knees.  [See for example, here and here].

I can’t find the RCCG’s arguments for restricting access to knee surgery for smokers and people who are overweight, but prima facie it looks a lot like a variant of victim blaming.

Full disclosure.  I am all for the rational allocation of resources.  I think smoking is a disgusting habit. I am overweight and trying to do something about it.  I also think that the arguments for resource allocation need to be more explicit about the social values upon which they are often implicitly based.